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THE LIFE TENANT AND INJURIES TO THE REMALINDER
Despite the fact that the majority rule .is contra, despite the
vigorous dissent of the minority of the committee, the Restatement of
Property has taken the position that where both the remainder and
the life estate have been injured by one act, the life tenant can re-
cover only his own damages.' Formerly he has been allowed to re-
cover in full the damages of both. Under the new rule, where A is
the life tenant and B the remainderman, both A and B must sue C
to recover for an injury to the estates of both committed by C. Why
this wrench from tradition9 What is its effect? Which is the better-
rule? To answer these questions it is the writer's purpose in this
note to examine briefly some of the consequences of this rule in the
light of the historical background leading to its adoption thirteen
years ago, to compare the results of its application with other situa-
tions where there are similar divisions of the possessory and non-
possessory interests in property
In very early times in England, as well as among the Germanic
forefathers of the English, property was chiefly personalty and in-
dividual ownership itself probably began with chattels rather than
realty Hence rights in personal property were the first to receive
the protection of the law, and therefore their study shall be the start
of our inquiry Even from the beginning there seems to have been a
difference between possessory and non-possessory remedies. The
earliest remedy for the theft of personal property was the fresh pur-
suit of the thief by the person who had been in possession. Owner-
ship was not necessary for the purpose of recovery, and indeed, the
owner could not recover from the thief unless he had also been the
possessor. This early emphasis upon possession, first found in ancient
cattle-stealing cases, was born of the absolute necessity for immed-
diate action such as could be taken only by the man on the spot, the
possessor. Similarly, where property had been in the possession of a
bailee, he was the only person who could recover and was absolutely
liable to the owner. Conversely, the owner's only remedy was against
the bailee?
1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY sec. 118 (1936) " the measure of
the damages recoverable by the owner of the estate for life is the
difference between the value of the estate for life is the difference
between the value of the estate for life before and its value after the
violation of such right, and does not include other damages, caused
by the conduct which constituted the violation, to the interests sub-
sequent to such estate for life."
HOLMES, COMMON LAW c. V (1881), 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 156-158 (2d ed. 1911) 1 WALSH, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 38-45 (1947).
3 Ibzd. The fresh pursuit of the thief, accompanied by raising the
hue and cry, was first noted in -cattle-stealing cases .and had to be
effected while the trail was less than thr..e days old. This vigorous
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As society *became more orderiy and legal remedies grew inorp
efficient, absolute liability tended to disappear from various parts of
the law. Tis tendency decreased the liability of the bailee and In-
creased the rights of the owner so that eventually the owner, in his
own right, could sue the person injuring the property' Since reaching
this stage of development the law has remained much the same, and
it is clear now that either the bailee or the owner may sue the tort-
feasor for the full amount of the injury to both," and that a recovery
by either will bar a subsequent action by the other.' Of course, when
the litigating party recovers for both he holds the other's propor-
tionate share of the recovery in trust for him, and failure to render
the other his proper share will make the litigating party liable.
Where A is the bailor, B the bailee, and C the tortfeasor, if B sues
and recovers from C, he holds the recovery in trust for A. A now
has no cause of action against C, but he may sue B if the latter fails
to account to him.
Some legal historians have asked why the bailee should be al-
lowed to recover in full, msisting that once the bailor could recover
in his own right, the reason for allowing a recovery by the bailee of
the full amount of the injuries to both no longer existed.' Tins ques-
tion, of course, assumes that originally the only reason for allowing
full recovery from the wrongdoer by one who had a mere possessory
title was that he was the only party who could sue. The courts, how-
ever, have postulated that the bailee could recover because he was
liable over to the bailor. The question then becomes: Is the bailee
liable because he has the action, or does he have the action because
he is liable? The most logical answer seems to be that of Pollock and
Maitland: "Perhaps we come nearest to historical truth if we say
that between the old rules there was no logical priority "
An often-cited English case, styled The Winkfield,"1 illustrates
the basic difficulties involved in determimng the possessor's rights
where it is clear that he is not liable to the owner. There the Post-
master General of England, suing as the bailee of those persons send-
ing mail, sought to recover the value of the mail lost in the negli-
primitive remedy is strikingly similar to the action taken by our
own early Western settlers in such cases and was produced by much
the same forces.
' 1 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY,
EXPLANATOR7V NOTES 193 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1931) HOLMES, op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 171.
The Wifikfield, (1902) P 42 (C.A.,) 1 WALSH, op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 91.
1 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 90.
-United Fruit Co. v United States, 33 F 2d 664 (C.C.A. 5th
1929).
HOLMES, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 164-167.
82 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 171 (2d ed.
1911).
" (1902) P 42 (C.A.)
441.
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gent collision of two steamships. As to that part of the mail for
which no claim had been made on the Postmaster and for which he
did not have the express permission of the senders to sue, the de-
fendant insisted that the bailee had no right to sue because the
bailors could sue in their own right, and the Postmaster could not be
held accountable in any event. Although the court was confronted
with a judicial precedent -of ten years standing to the effect that a
bailee could not recover full damages from a tortfeasor because he
was not liable to the bailor," this decision was reversed and recovery
was granted on the ground that possession is title against a wrong-
doer and that the latter cannot set up the right of a third person
unless he claims thereunder.
The development of possessory rights in personal property just
discussed, preceded and foreshadowed the development of corres-
ponding rights in realty In fact, most of the scanty rationalization
in the realty cases seems to have been taken in toto from the earlier
personal property cases. Originally the life tenant was held strictly
liable in an action of waste brought by the remainderman, even in
the case of accidental fires where there was no one against whom the
life tenant had a cause of action.' Later, although the life tenant was
not held to strict liability and could only be sued in an action of
waste for his own negligent or voluntary destruction of the prop-
erty, he still had the only action against a wrongdoing third party,
an action in trespass."z By the end of the seventeenth century the
remainderman was allowed a direct recovery from the tortfeasor,
x"
so that his remedy was similar to that of a bailor of personal prop-
erty. In both cases it was now possible for either the person with a
right to possession or the person with non-possessory rights in the
property to sue a third-party wrongdoer for the full amount of the
injury to both. As in the personalty cases, authorities insisted that
the life tenant should not be allowed to recover in full since he was
no longer absolutely liable to the remainderman, and, just as in the
" Claridge v The South Staffordshire Tramway Co., 1 Q.B. 422
(1892)
-R ESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, EXPLANATORY NOTES 224 (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1931)
"Waste, defined as an injury to the inheritance committed by
one who is rightfully in possession, has been divided into two classes,
voluntary waste and permissive waste. Although originally, as was
pointed out in the text, the life tenant would have been absolutely
liable in an action of waste for any injury to the remainder, he could
not now be held liable unless he committed some positive act of
destruction to the remainder (voluntary waste) or negligently per-
mitted an injury to, or destruction of the remainder (permissive
waste) However, the problem dealt with in this note, whether the
life tenant should be allowed to recover in full for an injury to both
the life estate and the remainder, is not concerned with waste since
it arises only when the life tenant is free from fault.
" Panton v. Isham, 3 Lev 359, 83 Eng. Rep. 729 (1694) Beding-
field v. Onslow, 3 Lev 209, 83 Eng. Rep. 654 (1685)
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personalty cases, the courts continued to allow a full recovery to the
life tenant. Once again, the courts have made little attempt to ration-
alize the position beyond saying that a wrongdoer should not be al-
lowed to set up 3us tertii, or that the life tenant is liable over to the
remainderman, ' 5 although the latter is obviously no longer true.
However, in Rogers v. Atlantic, G. & P Co.,' a case which has re-
ceived favorable comment,'" the court did adopt another line of rea-
soning. It admitted that the remainderman could now sue the wrong-
doer and also that the life tenant was no longer liable over to the
remainderman in such a case, but it pointed out that the long ad-
herence to the rule, even though the reasoning is no longer sound,
must be based upon some sound public policy. Therefore, the life
tenant was allowed full recovery, the court reasoning that the life
tenant occupied a position similar to that of a trustee of the property
of the remainderman.
This was the state of affairs at the time of the publication of the
Restatement of Property The rule adopted in the final draft, that the
life tenant should be allowed only his own damages, clearly is based
on the theory that the only reason for allowing the life tenant full
damages, including those to the reversion, stems from the fact that
the reversioner originally had no cause of action himself. As indi-
cated by the discussion in the Tentative Draft No. 3 of the Restate-
ment,' it was felt that the traditional rule is now obsolete since the
owner of the fee may now sue the wrongdoer in his own action. This
reasoning is based upon what is regarded as an axiomatic principle
of the law- An injured party should be restricted to a recovery of
those damages which the conduct of the defendant caused to this
particular plaintiff, and not allowed to recover for damages to
another. The full argument is that the old rule violated this principle
and thus restricted the remainderman's recovery to a portion of the
sum granted in a suit in which he had no voice and in which the life
tenant might not have pressed the action to the extent desired by the
owner of the fee. Those arguing in favor of the rule allowing full
recovery by the life tenant contended that the rule as adopted vio-
lates another fundamental of property law" Against a wrongdoer
possession is title. The expanded reasoning of this rule is that the
tortfeasor should not be allowed to bring up the technical question
of title as it is extraneous to the issue, unless the tortfeasor claims
there is no tort, because his own right, not that of another, is supe-,
ror to that of the possessor.
'5 Stapp v. Madera Canal Irrigation Co., 34 Cal. App. 41, 166 Pac.
823 (1917), Moeckel v Cross & Co., 190 Mass. 280, 76 N.E. 447 (1906)
" 213 N.Y. 246, 107 N.E. 661 (1915)
S1 Cox v Corrigan-McKinney Steel Company 248 Ky 426, 431,
58 S.W 2d 625, 628 (1933)
'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY Op. cit. supra note 10, at 193-199,
231-235.
1" Id. at 224-231, 235-236.
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Certainly the Restatement rule will create an inconsistency be-
tween -the principles of real property and those of personal property
unless -the new rule is to be adopted in the personal property cases
also. W6reover, as was pointed out in the Rogers Case, supra, there
is a peculiar relationship, between the life tenant and the remainder-
man which is akin to trusteeship. Upon the ground of public policy
the traditional rule allowing full recovery would seem to be more
advantageous to the interests of both the public and the tortfeasor
in that there would only be one lawsuit, the troublesome issue of
title would not have to be litigated, and the tortfeasor would be pro-
tected from suits by the holders of unrecorded interests in the land.
In addition, it would be better for the remainderman to have his
interests protected by the life tenant who is at the spot where the
injury occurs, and certainly better where there are contingent re-
maindermen, no one of whom is willing to take the risk of litigation
from which he may derive no benefit. The interests of the life
tenant would seem to favor assessing and evaluating the damages
for the injury to both estates in one suit, for, despite the division of
interests between the life tenant and the remainderman, the injury
affects only one tract of realty.
In summary it would seem that ample support for either view
may be found in the common law and the early history of possessory
remedies, depending upon the searcher's preconception of the prob-
lem. In the Restatement argument it was admitted by both factions
that the traditional rule allowing full recovery to the life tenant is
better from the standpoint of both the life tenant and the tortfeasor,
with a difference of opinion existing only as to which rule is better
as a matter of public policy and better for the interests of the owners
of the fee. To this extent the Restatement discussion ended in a
stalemate and the later cases show no pronounced trend in support
of one rule as against the other. In fact, no cases have been found
which mention the Restatement rule as such.
Since the merits of the two rules appear to be in balance it
would seem proper to seek a middle ground which would eliminate
as many of the undesirable results as possible. In the author's view
making both the life tenant and the remainderman necessary parties
in an action by either would obviate many of the difficulties.2 ' The
rights of all the parties could be adjudicated and apportioned in one
action in which all the interested parties are represented, while the
tortfeasor would have to defend only one suit and would discharge
his-.entire liability at that time. Since this action would be a bar to
any further suit, the wrongdoer would' be protected even against
unrecorded interests in the land, while 'the holders of such claims
-I. at 234.
-"Beck v Lynch, 306 Ky 738, 209 S.W 2d 58 (1947) Cox v.
.Corrigan-McKinney Steel Company supra note 17. These cases indi-
cate that in Kentucky joinder is certainly permissible, but the effect
of nonjoinder is not apparent.
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would have a right of action over against the life tenant if they had
not been made parties to the action. Either the life tenant or the
owner of the fee could bring the action promptly the cost being
divided between them. Even the contingent remamderman would
be protected under the doctrine of virtual representation."
This is a situation in which parsimony of effort should control:
between possible solutions to the problem, common sense and
economy of effort should decree that we adopt the one most simple,
direct, and easy to administer.
F H. DAUGHERTY
2 Cox v. Corrigan-McKinney Steel Company, supra note 17. For
a discussion of the cases on virtual representation see Note, 37 Ky.
L. J. 96 (1948).
